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Great Power Politics and the Structure of Foreign
Relations Law
Daniel Abebe*

I. INTRODUCTION

Foreign relations law serves as an internal constraint on the unilateral
exercise of foreign relations powers through the distribution of authority within
the national government. Given the predominance of the executive branch in
foreign affairs, courts routinely resolve questions regarding the breadth of the
executive's authority by reference to the Constitution, legal precedent, historical
practice, and functional considerations. Though courts generally focus on these
domestic factors, they have been historically quite sensitive to the international
political implications of their decisions. But we don't have a clear understanding
of how or when courts consider international politics in resolving foreign
relations law questions. We lack a framework to begin thinking about the
relationship between international politics and the allocation of decisionmaking
authority.
This short Article frames foreign relations law as a function of international
politics to explore the relationship between the strength of external international
political constraints on a state and the levels of judicial deference to the
executive in that state. Variation in the structure of international politicsbipolar, multipolar or unipolar-likely produces variation in the strength of
external constraints on a state. This approach yields a simple descriptive claim
and a related predictive claim. The stronger the external constraints on a state,
such as the constraints present in multi-polar or bipolar worlds, the greater the
likelihood of judicial deference to the executive on institutional competency
grounds. Conversely, the weaker the external constraints on a state, such as the
constraints present in a unipolar world, the lesser the likelihood of judicial
deference to the executive. If this claim is accurate, it leads to a predictive claim
that the rate of judicial deference to the executive will likely decrease as long as
Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan
Masur, Nuno Monteiro, and Eric Posner for helpful comments.
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the United States is the hegemon of a unipolar world. This approach also
provides a clearer picture of the overall level of constraint on the executive,
helps describe the impact of external constraints on judicial deference, and
explores the effects of international politics on the US's engagement with
international law. Consider the following example:
Imagine a state with a constitution that is over two hundred years old.
Imagine that the state's constitution rests on a theory of separation of powers
and provides a tripartite allocation of foreign relations law authority. The initial
allocation to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches is short and
incomplete, leaving many questions regarding the proper constitutional
allocation to subsequent political and judicial resolution. Imagine further that the
institutional power and influence of one branch-the executive-has grown
dramatically since the initial allocation, often resulting in judicial deference to the
executive on foreign relations questions because of historical practice,
institutional competence, and greater political accountability. If the legislative
branch of this state generally follows the executive as well, and the executive has
institutional advantages in generating political support for its policies, the
executive could then act in many instances with significant independence from
domestic constitutional constraints.
Now one might pause to ask if this particular allocation of foreign relations
law authority is problematic. Some might favor stronger internal constraints on
executive authority, others weaker. For many, the debate might stop here. But
this provides only a partial picture of the breadth of executive authority. We
must turn to examining the strength of external constraints for a complete
picture.
Our hypothetical state might pursue its interests in a world with two or
more competing states of similar economic and military strength-a multipolar
world with other great powers. In pursuing their national interests, these other
great powers serve as external constraints on the executive; they represent an
external disciplining force to moderate the executive's foreign relations
decisionmaking. The executive must account for the interests of competing great
powers and internalize the costs that those competing great powers could
impose. Therefore, extant internal constraints from foreign relations law are
supported by the strength of external constraints from great power politics. The
overall level of constraints on the executive is high.
But what happens if our hypothetical state has the same allocation between
its three branches of foreign relations law authority-with significant judicial
deference to the executive-and is also the hegemon of the international
system? By definition, the other powerful states are significantly weaker than our
state. If so, those states would no longer serve as a meaningful external
constraint on the executive's decisionmaking, effectively leaving the executive
with significant freedom from both internal and external constraints. In this
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unipolar world, the executive would have greater capacity for unilateral action.
The overall level of constraint on the executive is lower because the external
constraints are weaker. In both examples, the overall quality of constraints on
executive decisionmaking is a function of the strength of internal and external
factors, namely domestic legal rules and great power politics.
It is probably clear that the hypothetical state is the US and the description
roughly reflects the allocation of decisionmaking authority among the branches
of the American government today. The purpose of this Article is neither to
reassign specific foreign relations law powers to certain branches nor to set the
optimal level of executive authority. The Article is agnostic on these issues.
Rather, the Article aims to show that the strength of external constraints might
influence the level of judicial deference to the executive. Section II develops a
simple framework for thinking about the relationship between great power
politics and the allocation of decisionmaking authority. Section III outlines the
descriptive and predictive claims about the specific impact of great power
politics on judicial deference. Section IV examines whether the predictive claim
is normatively preferable in light of the impact of great power politics on
international law. Section V concludes by discussing the possible convergence of
American politics, foreign relations law, and US foreign policy.
II. LINKING FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW TO GREAT POWER
POLITICS
The phrase "great power politics"' evokes images of the powerful nations
of the world competing to maximize wealth, territory and military influence
across the globe. In international relations theory terms, great power politics
refers to the pursuit of material power by powerful states in the international
system to achieve security.2 But the contemporary meaning of the phrase is
perhaps broader than that. In a post-Cold War world, great powers are also
concerned with the threats of non-state actors and failed states, and interested in
shaping the content, breadth, and reach of international law. Though the exact
objects of competition may have changed and the demand for international legal
rules may have grown, great power politics still revolves around state
competition for power and influence.
In this understanding of the phrase "great power politics," the focus is on
the effects of great power politics along the international dimension. Great

2

For purposes of this article, I use the phrases "international politics" and "great power politics"
interchangeably.
Realism is the most prominent international relations theory focusing on power. For a general
discussion of realism and power politics, see John J.Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
(Norton 2001); Kenneth N. Waltz, Tbeoy of InternationalPolitics(McGraw-Hill 1979).
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power politics will always matter-the only change is that the locus of
competition has moved from international politics to international law. Though
this definition generally reflects state behavior, its narrow focus on the
international dimension masks the possible relationship between great power
politics and the allocation of foreign relations authority in the domestic sphere.
In other words, does the structure of international politics influence the
domestic allocation of decisionmaking authority? In the following subsection I
begin to answer that question by discussing the structure of US foreign relations
law as a system of internal constraints on the executive's decisionmaking
authority.
A. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW AS AN INTERNAL CONSTRAINT
The Constitution of the US provides the initial allocation of foreign
relations law powers among the different branches of the national government.
The Constitution grants Congress the majority of foreign relations law
decisionmaking authority in Article I, including the power to declare war,3 raise
and support an army,4 and define and punish offenses against the law of
nations.5 In Article II, the President has a narrower grant of independent
authority-the Commander-in-Chief Clause 6 and the Take Care Clause'-and
shares concurrent authority with Congress regarding the making of treaties and
appointment of ambassadors.8 Finally, Article III provides the federal courts
with jurisdiction over cases arising out of treaties or affecting ambassadors,
federal statutes touching upon foreign relations law concerns, and diversity
disputes.9 From a historical standpoint, the Constitution's allocation was
influenced alternatively by the structural and political failings of the Continental
Congress; the underlying theory of checks and balances in government; the
parochial interests of the several states; the international political challenges of
the young US in the late eighteenth century; and the legacy of the English legal
system. But, as the US began engaging in international politics, it became clear
that the initial constitutional allocation was neither comprehensive nor
determinative, particularly with respect to the executive's decisionmaking
authority.

3

US Const, art I, § 8, cl 11.

4

Id, art ,

5

Id, art I,

8, cl 12.

6

8, cl 10.
Id, art 1I, § 2, cl 1.

7

Id, art II, § 3.

8

Id, art II,

9

US Const, art III, § 2.

2, c 2.
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For example, Article II has few enumerated grants but includes general
grants that lack clear definition. How broad is the Vesting Clause?'0 How should
we understand the Commander-in-Chief Clause?" Can the President terminate a
treaty without congressional approval? 2 Several seemingly important questions
regarding the President's power to determine US foreign policy, commit the US
to war without a congressional declaration, acquire territory, and sign executive
agreements were left unanswered in the initial allocation. The constitutional
design of foreign relations powers was not based solely on the optimal allocation
of executive authority; rather, the allocation reflected the balance of competing
institutional, theoretical, and functional concerns at a particular historical
moment.
Against this background, courts have attempted to resolve some foreign
relations law questions for which there are no clear constitutional grants. They
have generally considered both the theoretical basis of the Constitution's initial
allocation and the functional consequences of distributing decisionmaking
authority to one branch over another. When considering the theoretical basis,
courts have looked to the underlying intent of the Framers, the sources of the
national government's foreign relations authority, and the importance of
separation of powers concerns. Additionally, the evaluation of constitutional
theory has been supplemented, over time, with functional considerations: an
examination of historical practice,' 3 institutional competencies, and political
accountability. 4 Despite judicial attention to both theoretical and functional
concerns, these concerns are not dispositive for the resolution of all foreign
relations law questions; rather, they are somewhat indeterminate as there is no
clear metric to weigh one concern over another. How broadly should courts
frame implied powers drawn from the Constitution's textual grants? Should
functional concerns-institutional competencies or historical practice-trump
underlying theoretical separation of powers considerations? Should functional
concerns circumvent textual grants of power? Like in other areas of
10 Id, art II, § 1. For a general discussion, see Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The
Executive Power over ForeignAffairs, 111 Yale L J 231 (2001).
11
12

13

14

US Const, art II, § 2, cl 1.
The Constitution enumerated the concurrent Treaty Power that created a procedure for making
treaties without providing guidance on treaty termination. US Const, art I1, § 2, cl 2.
For an example of the role of historical practice, see Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 US 654, 686
(1981) ("Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but 'long continued practice, known to
and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in
pursuance of its consent .. ").
For an examination of functional consideration and institutional competency supporting an
expansive use of the political question doctrine in foreign relations law, see generally Jide Nzeibe,
The Uniqueness of ForeignAffairs, 89 Iowa L Rev 941 (2004).
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constitutional law, courts are left to use competing interpretive methods to
determine the intent of the Framers, read implied powers from enumerated
grants, weigh functional concerns against formal grants, defer to the
institutionally competent political branches, and consider the institutional and
political consequences of their decisions.
The process of resolving foreign relations law questions occurs under the
shadow of the general growth of executive power in foreign relations. As the
assumed representative of the US in international politics, the executive has,
gradually and incrementally, assumed many of the powers necessary for
governance despite often lacking a clear textual grant of authority. For example,
the executive has taken the predominant role in formulating American foreign
policy,15 determining the US position on customary international law, and
terminating treaties 6 all without specific Article II textual grants. Simultaneously,
courts have developed various prudential tools-the political-question
doctrine, 7 the act-of-state doctrine, 8 and international comity doctrines,' 9
among others-that often result in judicial deference to the executive. If
Congress tends to follow the executive on most foreign relations questions, the
contemporary breadth of executive power has far surpassed the initial
constitutional allocation.
Combined with the general growth of the administrative state and federal
power, foreign relations law operates as a set of rules to govern the executive's
exercise of decisionmaking authority. Since the executive is generally the "first
mover" on foreign relations questions, the domestic set of rules applied and
interpreted by the courts are internal constraints on executive decisionmaking. °

16

Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law: Cases and Materials 176 (Aspen 2d
ed 2006) ("In practice, the Executive Branch exercises a virtual monopoly over formal
communications with foreign nations and also plays a lead role in announcing U.S. foreign
policy.").
Consider Goldwater v Carter,444 US 996 (1979) (refusing on political question grounds to resolve

17

issue regarding the executive branch's decision to terminate a treaty without congressional
consent).
See id at 996; Made in the USA Foundation v UnitedStates, 242 F3d 1300 (11 th Cir 2001).

15

18

19

20

For the seminal case on the act-of-state doctrine, see Banco National de Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 US
398 (1964). For a discussion of the act-of-state doctrine from an international relations theory
perspective, see Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalismand the Act of
State Doctrine, 92 Colum L Rev 1907 (1992).
For an example of international comity, see Ungaro-Benages v DresdnerBank Ag, 379 F3d 1227 (11 th
Cir 2004).
Some might argue that framing foreign relations law as a set of constraints on executive
decisionmaking is inaccurate. Foreign relations law could alternatively be conceptualized as a
system of rules to empower each coordinate branch in specified issue areas or effectuate an
underlying separation of powers theory of governance. While those readings are certainly
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What should we think of these constraints? Some argue that deference to the
executive based on its significant functional advantages, with limited judicial
review, is always preferred. 2 Others counter that this is at odds with the initial
constitutional allocation and separation of powers, resulting in a potentially
dangerous concentration of power in one branch, and argue for greater judicial
review of executive decisionmaking.22 Are there external variables that might
explain when courts are more likely to defer to the executive? The answer
requires an examination of the external constraints generated by great power
politics.
B. GREAT POWER POLITICS AS AN EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT
How are great power politics and foreign relations law linked? For this
Article's purposes, the phrase "great power politics" represents the competition
among the most powerful states to influence international politics, pursue their
national interests, and shape the content of international law. It assumes that
states are self-interested and, in some areas of international politics, concerned
with material power.23 Despite the heterogeneity of national interests, power
often enables the achievement of both pragmatic and aspirational state goals,

21

defensible as a theoretical matter, as a practical matter the dramatic increase of executive power in
foreign relations law over the last two-hundred years-far beyond the Constitution's textual
allocation-and the executive's primacy in exercising foreign relations authority suggest that the
rules operate, in their current form, to either empower or limit executive decisionmaking. That the
application of these rules by courts is inconsistent and varies based on theoretical and functional
considerations does not reject the executive's institutional dominance in foreign relations. Against
this background, in many areas, foreign relations law operates as a constraint on the executive's
exercise of decisionmaking authority.
See Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Chevroniing Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L J 1170,

22

1204-1207 (2007). For arguments that high levels of deference to the executive in times of crisis
or emergencies is appropriate, see generally Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele, Terror in the
Balance: Securiy, libery and the Courts (Oxford 2007); Richard A. Posner, Not a Suiide Pact: The
Constitution in a Time of NationalEmegen y (Oxford 2006).
See Derek Jinks and Neal K. Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L J 1230, 1230

23

(2007) ('We maintain that increased judicial deference to the executive in the foreign relations
domain is inappropriate."). See also Harold H. Koh, The National Securio Constitution: SharingPower
after the Iran-ContraAffair 181-84 (Yale 1990).
It is important to state clearly that one does not have to accept all aspects of realism to
understand its potential in linking great power politics to foreign relations law. US foreign policy,
for example, often reflects a frustrating combination of competing and sometimes contradictory
international relations theory assumptions, producing tension between the stated foreign policy
goals and the methods used to achieve them. No single theory can explain all state behavior in
international politics. However, even those who challenge realism's theoretical weaknesses do not
assert that power never matters in international politics. For a claim about the strong influence of
realism on foreign relations law jurisprudence, see Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the
ForeignAffairs Constitution,41 Ariz St L J 87 (2009).
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and power relationships among great powers still play a significant role in
explaining state behavior. While power is clearly not the only explanatory
variable, it is certainly relevant to understanding international political outcomes.
The presence of competing great powers is a constraint on state
decisionmaking. For example, assume that we live in a multipolar world with
four great powers of comparable military and economic strength-Countries A,
B, and C, and the US. These great powers pursue their national interests, at
times seeking security through power but perhaps also spreading democracy,
promoting human rights, and developing international law. Beyond thinking
about power, the national interests of these great powers will likely vary
according to their internal politics, normative aspirations, national history,
nationalism, culture, demographics or resource endowment, among other
factors.
Naturally, in a world with such tremendous heterogeneity among states,
finite resources, and national interests, we might expect to see some friction as
great powers interact in pursuit of their respective foreign policy goals. The US
may not be able to realize a particular foreign policy goal because it recognizes
that Countries A and B have strong competing interests. The US might conclude
that the benefit from achieving a foreign policy goal may be outweighed by the
costs that Countries A and B could impose on the US. Similarly, Country C may
not pursue some of its goals for fear of antagonizing another great power. In
this environment, each great power is circumscribed in shaping its foreign policy
goals and determining the mechanisms to achieve them by the presence of other
competing great powers. The inevitable frictions of great power politics limit
foreign policy goals by imposing costs on the various state actors. Those costs
serve as external constraints on a state's foreign relations law decisionmaking.
In this example, the executive of the US would operate under a system of
internal foreign relations law constraints and the aforementioned external great
power politics constraints. Even if internal constraints are weak-for example,
limited judicial review of executive decisionmaking-executive authority is still
limited by the strength of external constraints. Judicial deference to the executive
might not be a problem when the executive's capacity to act unilaterally is
restricted by the costs imposed by great power politics. By viewing the complete
picture of constraints, we have a better understanding of the true breadth of
executive authority.
Starting with the previous example and holding the weak internal
constraints constant, let's assume that one of our four countries-the USgrows in material power by developing an economy and military larger and more
potent than the other great powers. The power advantage may have arisen due
to better economic policies, technological advancement, improvements in
worker productivity or, in some cases, due to the internal economic or political
problems facing competing great powers. Whatever the reason, the US has
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gained in relative power vis-A-vis Countries A, B, and C. Since the US's growth
far outpaces that of the formerly comparable great powers, the US is now a
superpower or hegemon. The formerly multipolar international system with four
comparable great powers is now a unipolar system, with one great power: the
Us.
As the new hegemon, the US has greater capacity to pursue its national
interests and expand its foreign policy goals. Why? The potential for friction
with competing great powers and attendant costs for the US dissipate in a
unipolar world. The cost/benefit analysis for the US changes: the benefits from
realizing a particular foreign policy goal might now outweigh the potential costs
of friction with weaker great powers. The US could pursue foreign policy goals
in the unipolar world that would have been much more difficult in the
multipolar world previously described. Most importantly, the weak internal
constraints on the executive are compounded by the weak external constraints
from great power politics.
As we can see, foreign relations law is a set of internal constraints on
executive authority. But this is not the only type of constraint. Great power
politics also generates external constraints. Though simplistic, framing foreign
relations law and great power politics as mutually reinforcing constraints on
executive decisionmaking suggests that allocation decisions may very well reflect
a combination of internal and external factors.
III. IMPACT OF GREAT POWER POLITICS ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW
A. DESCRIPTIVE CLAIM
How is great power politics relevant to understanding the domestic
allocation of decisionmaking authority? In bipolar and multipolar worlds, we
know that there is no single hegemon and that the great powers will inevitably
compete in pursuit of their respective interests. The external constraints on great
powers are stronger as each great power must compete with the other great
powers-whether friend or foe-to achieve its national interests. The very
presence of competing great powers and the costs that they can impose make
the achievement of foreign policy goals more difficult in multipolar and bipolar
worlds. The executive's institutional advantages-speed, flexibility, uniformity,
secrecy and technical expertise-are essential for the state to pursue its national
interests in this complex international political environment.
But the shift from a multipolar or bipolar world to a unipolar world
changes the analysis. In a unipolar world, the external constraints on the
hegemon are significantly weaker as a consequence of the hegemon's dominance
of international politics. If the US is the hegemon in a unipolar world, it can
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pursue its national interests without the substantial costs that the presence of
competing great powers could impose. The external constraints created by great
power politics do not constrain the US to the same degree. From a position of
dominance in international politics, the executive's institutional advantages are
important but might not be critical to achieve the national interest.
If this descriptive claim is correct, we should see higher levels of judicial
deference to the executive when the US is one of several competing great
powers in a multipolar or bipolar world, and lower levels of judicial deference
when the US is the hegemon of a unipolar world. To examine this claim, at a
bare minimum one would need to specify the periods of multipolarity and
bipolarity; define judicial deference; 24 and determine the degree to which foreign
relations law precedent is consistent with the claim. This is clearly beyond the
scope of this short article. However, a rough, non-scientific evaluation of the
major precedent from these periods appears to support the descriptive claim
outlined here.
During the twentieth century, the US was one of several great powers in a
multipolar system from roughly the beginning of World War I until the end of
World War II, and one of two great powers in a bipolar system from the early
1950s until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.25 The cases here appear to
support the claim. Even if we exclude the World War II precedent, it can be
argued that Curiss-Wrigh, 26 Baker v Carr,27 Sabbafino,28 Goldwater v Garter, 29 and

24

25

26

27

28

29

For a discussion of judicial deference in foreign relations law, see generally, Curtis A. Bradley,
Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va L Rev 649 (2000); Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating
Deference: Hamdan, the JudicialPowerand Executive Treaty Intetpretations,92 Iowa L Rev 1723 (2007).
See Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics at 334-59 (cited in note 1) (defining bipolarity
and multipolarity and describing their prevalence in international politics).
See United States v Curtiss-WrightExport Corp, 299 US 304, 320 (1936) (describing "the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations...").
See Baker v Car, 369 US 186, 211 (1962) ("Not only does resolution of [foreign relations] issues
frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or invoke the exercise of a discretion
demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature; but many such questions uniquely
demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views.").
See Sabbaino, 376 US at 432-33 ("When articulating the principles of international law in its
relations with other states, the Executive Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally
accepted and traditional rules, as would the courts, but also an advocate of standards it believes
desirable for the community of nations and protective of national concerns. In short, whatever
way the matter is cut, the possibility of conflict between the Judicial and Executive branches could
hardly be avoided").
See Goldwater,444 US at 996.
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United States v Belmont,3° among other cases, are examples of the judiciary's
willingness both to apply prudential doctrines to avoid reviewing some executive
branch decisions and to define broadly executive power in foreign affairs. While
certainly not determinative, these cases and their progeny suggest that courts
were sensitive to the strong external constraints of multipolar and bipolar worlds
in adjudicating foreign relations law cases.
Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the US has been the
hegemon of a unipolar world.3 Unipolarity generates weaker external constraints
for the hegemonic state-the US-than the bipolar and multipolar systems
described above. Consistent with the descriptive claim, we should see lower
levels of deference as external constraints weaken. This will not occur
instantaneously or without exception; the tension between extant foreign
relations law precedent and the effect of unipolarity will likely produce
inconsistent decisions as courts navigate the new international political
environment. Moreover, public disillusionment with the Bush Administration's
handling of the War on Terror and the Iraq invasion might influence the
judiciary's willingness to defer to executive branch determinations, particularly
when the case involves restrictions on individual liberty. In other words, there is
significant noise that might obscure a long-term trend.
Nonetheless, in only eighteen years we have seen the proliferation of
international human rights litigation 32 culminating in the Supreme Court's
decision in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, in which the Court permitted limited
international human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute (despite the
executive's arguments that it was simply a jurisdictional statute that did not
create a cause of action).3 3 In Hamdi, the Court rejected the executive's claim that
it could hold a citizen enemy combatant without trial and concluded that the

30

31

32

33

See United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 330 (1937) ("Governmental power over external affairs is
not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government. And in respect of what was
done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that government.").
For a discussion of unipolarity and international politics, see generally, Symposium, International
Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarniy, 61 World Pol 1 (2009); Stephen G. Brooks &
William C. Wohlforth, World Out Of Balance: International Relations Theory And The Challenge Of
American Ptimagy (2008); Barry R. Posen, Command of the Commons: The Militagy Foundation of U.S.
Hegemony, 28 Ind Sec 5 (2003).
For a survey of recent international human rights litigation, see generally Beth Stephens, Upsettng
Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration'sEfforts to Limit Human Rights I'tigation, 17 Harv Hum
RtsJ 169 (2004).
See Sosa vAvareZ-Machain, 542 US 692, 724 (2004) ("The jurisdictional grant is best read as having
been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for [a]
modest number of international law violations...").
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government's due process protections were inadequate.34 In Hamdan, the Court
held that the executive's military commissions established to try enemy
combatants at Guantanamo Bay were in violation of domestic law and
international treaties. 35 Finally, in Boumediene, the Court rejected the executive's
contentions that the Detainee Treatment Act was a suitable substitute for habeas
corpus review.36
If after further research this descriptive claim proves accurate, what might
explain the rough correlation between the strength of external constraints and
the level of judicial deference to the executive? In a multipolar or bipolar world,
courts might be concerned sub rosa that lower levels of deference through
greater review of executive actions combined with the strong external
constraints from a multipolar or bipolar world might over-constrain the
executive, impeding its ability to pursue the US's foreign policy goals. Moreover,
courts might implicitly conclude that higher levels of deference to the executive
would be mitigated by the strength of the external constraints from great power
politics. In other words, the potential risks from the increased breadth of the
executive's expanded decisionmaking authority-for example, an expansive
conception of the executive's independent military powers---diminish in light of
the costs that competing great powers could impose on the US.
However, if the US is the hegemon of a unipolar world without
comparable great powers, courts might be more concerned that the risks related
to high levels of deference to the executive would be exacerbated by the weak
external constraints from great power politics. Since the unipolar world
generates weaker constraints on the US's ability to pursue the national interest,
courts might conclude that the benefits of increased judicial review of executive
action outweigh the costs of limiting executive decisionmaking authority,
particularly in the absence of competing great powers.
This crude analysis suggests that there might be a relationship between the
structure of international politics and the level of judicial deference to the
executive. As the external constraints from great power politics strengthen,
judicial deference to the executive appears to increase. Similarly, as the external
constraints weaken, courts appear to be more willing to review executive branch
34

See Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 535-36 (2004) ("[W]e necessarily reject the Government's
assertion that separation of power principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts
in such circumstances").

35

See Hamdan v Rumsfrld, 548 US 557, 622 (2006) ("[W]e conclude that the 'practicability'
determination that the President has made is insufficient to justify variances from the procedures
governing courts-martial.").
See Boumediene v Bush, 128 S Ct 2229, 2277 (2008) ('Within the Constitution's separation-of-

36

powers structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the
responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a person.").
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decisionmaking. Although the tentative descriptive claim outlined here requires
much more investigation to determine its validity, framing foreign relations law
as a function of international politics helps to understand the relationship
between international politics and domestic legal decisionmaking.
B. PREDICTIVE CLAIM
The descriptive claim about the effects of great power politics on judicial
deference leads to a related predictive claim. If the US remains as the hegemon
of a unipolar world,3" over time we should see a general trend toward lower
levels of deference to the executive. With the exception of crises that demand
the unique institutional competencies of the executive,38 courts may be more
willing to review executive decisionmaking and consequently reduce the extent
of executive authority as they perceive the constraints from great power politics
weaken. What are the implications of the descriptive and predictive claims?
Courts are more sensitive to the structure of international politics and the
quality of external constraints-extra-constitutional concerns-in determining
the allocation of decisionmaking authority than previously thought. Judges
appear to consider the potential foreign policy consequences, both explicitly and
sub rosa, of their decisions through the use of prudential deference doctrines
and the interpretation of legal precedent. Though much more work is necessary
to demonstrate the relationship, variation in the external constraints generated
by great power politics may very well be salient to the disposition of some
foreign relations law issues and, perhaps more controversially, more influential
on courts than traditional doctrinal rules.
Great power politics, however, is unlikely to be salient for all foreign
relations issues. Variation in the structure of international politics will likely
affect questions on the distribution of decisionmaking authority the level of
judicial deference to the executive and does not purport to determine the
appropriate resolution of narrower, technical questions of foreign relations law.
For example, it is more likely that great power politics would be relevant for
issues that directly implicate the extent of the executive's decisionmaking
authority: the limitations on the exercise of the President's independent military
powers; the breadth of Article II's textual grants; the level of judicial deference
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See Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics at 334-59 (cited in note 1). But see Fareed
Zakaria, The Post-American World (2008) (describing the challenges that the US will face as other
great powers rise and challenge the extant unipolar order).
See Posner and Sunstein, 116 Yale LJ at 1204-1207 (cited in note 21). For a general discussion of
the point, see Posner and Verrnuele, Terror in the Balance (cited in note 21); Posner, Not a Suicide
Pact(cited in note 21).
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to executive determinations; the executive's unilateral termination of defenserelated treaties; the extent of US participation in international judicial tribunals
or international institutions; and the weight of historical practice and functional
considerations in resolving foreign relations law questions.
But is the predictive claim normatively preferable? This depends on
assumptions about the relationship between great power politics and
international law.
IV. IMPACT OF GREAT POWER POLITICS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW
What is the relationship between great power politics and the US's
engagement with international law? Identifying a framework for analysis in this
context is more complicated because it depends on existing assumptions about
the international relations theory that best explains state behavior; the
development and content of international law; the efficacy of international law
as a coercive instrument; and the regularity of state compliance with
international law. For example, if states are rational, power-seeking, selfinterested actors and they operate in a world with no central enforcement
mechanism, we might expect compliance with international law when its content
is consistent with state interests and non-compliance when its content is
inconsistent with those interests." This logic of compliance would apply to great
power behavior in bipolar, multipolar and unipolar worlds with one slight
modification: the hegemonic state in a unipolar world might be more willing to
ignore international law because its dominance of international politics and
capacity to internalize the attendant reputational costs that such a course of
action would likely generate. The US, as the current hegemon of international
politics, likely has a greater capacity than any other state to absorb the costs of
violating international law in some issue areas, though this may not be
normatively preferable or sustainable over the medium-to-long term. From this
perspective, variation in the structure of international politics would likely not
39

This is perhaps more reflective of a rational self-interest conception of state compliance with
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have the same impact on the US's engagement with international law as it
appears to have on foreign relations law.
Working from this perspective, it is not clear that the executive's
institutional competencies are any less important in a unipolar world with
weaker external constraints than in a bipolar or multipolar world with stronger
external constraints. States are still rational, self-interested actors competing to
influence the development of international law, the power of international
institutions and the content of international regulatory regimes. In a world of
failed states, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the diffusion of
weapons technology, the executive's institutional expertise is still critical.
Arguably, in a world with increasingly powerful non-state actors and the
diffusion of weapons technology, the traditional model of deterrence is no
longer applicable; states must be more vigilant in ensuring the safety of its
citizens. Though the structure of international politics has changed, the
arguments for judicial deference to the executive are still persuasive.
In contrast, a change in the assumptions about international relations
theory4 and international law will lead to a different conception of great power
politics and its impact on the US's engagement with international law. Realism is
an anachronism, reflecting only the past bipolar and multipolar worlds in which
power and self-interest motivated state behavior. In a unipolar world of
international institutions, democratic governance 4 ' and global interdependence,
international law encourages state cooperation, diffuses shared norms and
promotes international order. As the challenges of interdependence grow-for
example, environmental degradation and human trafficking-the demand for
multilateral coordinated solutions through international mechanisms also grows.
International institutions are the fora for states to address these issues, while
international law is the tool to implement solutions and regulate state
compliance. International law, not great power politics, is the key to address the
issues of the future.
From this perspective, the US's hegemonic status in a unipolar world; its
support of democracy, human rights and rule of law; and its historical
commitment to international institutions like the United Nations, the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund; provide an opportunity for the US
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to create a global legal architecture to legalize international politics.4" Achieving
these goals requires a greater role for courts to ensure the US's commitment to
international law, multilateral treaties and democratic governance. With greater
judicial review of executive decisionmaking, the US would likely be more willing
to comply with international law, consider the greater integration of international
law into the domestic legal system, and expand international human rights
litigation.43 Assuming that this is the future of international relations, the shift
from multipolarity and bipolarity to the current unipolar world privileges the
judiciary's institutional competencies over those of the executive and encourages
greater participation by courts in foreign affairs. Though the descriptive and
predictive claims suggest lower levels of judicial deference to the executive as
unipolarity continues, any analysis on whether this is normatively preferable will
be driven by underlying assumptions about international relations theory, US
foreign policy and international law.
V. CONCLUSION: AMERICAN POLITICS AND FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW
This Article explored the salience of great power politics on the allocation
of foreign relations law decisionmaking authority. Examining foreign relations
law through a lens of international politics also leads to potentially fruitful
avenues of thought on the convergence of American politics, foreign relations
law, and international relations theory.
If great power politics is relevant for understanding judicial deference to
the executive, it could be argued that the structure of the coordinate branches
(domestic institutional politics) is also relevant in thinking about foreign
relations law. While scholars have certainly thought about these questions on
functional lines with respect to the institutional competencies of the coordinate
branches, it may be fruitful to examine whether institutional cultures or norms
generate consistent outcomes on foreign relations law issues. For example, does
the organizational structure, decisionmaking processes, or political incentives of
each branch lead to specific perspectives on foreign relations law or international
law more broadly? Is the executive branch, regardless of the political affiliation
of its occupant, likely to privilege systematically material power and national
security concerns over those associated with legitimacy, social norms, and
international law? Conversely, is the judiciary more likely to interpret treaty
terms expansively or encourage the greater integration of international law into
42
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the domestic legal system? Although these are crude dichotomies, understanding
the institutional predisposition of the coordinate branches may be relevant for
optimizing the allocation of foreign relations law powers. The very allocation of
decisionmaking authority to one branch over another may be dispositive for the
resolution of some issues, particularly if there is empirical evidence that the
branches are predisposed to approach foreign relations law questions from
competing perspectives.
Finally, it might be preferable for courts to engage in an explicit discussion
of international politics as they resolve some foreign relations law questions. In
an interdependent world, the allocation of foreign relations law authority will
increasingly influence US foreign policy, the US's engagement with international
law and its participation in international institutions. The rise of global
governance in the social, political, and economic aspects of state life, the greater
harmonization of legal rules, and the continued salience of international
institutions as tools of international politics blur the distinctions between
international politics, American foreign policy, and foreign relations law
questions. The convergence is imminent but our thinking about the role of
international politics in the interpretation of foreign relations law rules has not
quite kept pace.
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